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Securities—Insiders' Liability under Section 16(b) on Second Sale
In Two-Step Selldown Transactions—Reliance Electric Co. v. Emer-
son Electric Co.1—On June 16, 1967, Emerson Electric Company
acquired 13.2 percent of the common stock of Dodge Manufacturing
Company at $63 per share, in an attempt to take over Dodge. 2 Prior to
this purchase Emerson did not own any Dodge common. Soon after the
purchase Dodge shareholders approved a defensive merger with Reli-
ance Electric Company, and Emerson was faced with the prospect of
having to exchange its shares of Dodge for stock in the merged corpo-
ration.a Deciding to sell out completely, Emerson sold 37,000 shares of
Dodge on August 28 at $68 per share, thereby reducing its holding in
Dodge to 9.96 percent of the outstanding common. The remaining
shares were then sold to Dodge at $69 per share on September 11,
1967.4
Reliance demanded the profits realized by Emerson on both sales,
whereupon Emerson filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment°
as to its liability under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.° The federal district court decided first that Emerson became
1
 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
2 In 1966, Emerson was engaged in merger negotiations with Dodge. However,
on March 12, 1967, Emerson was advised that Dodge's board of directors had rejected
Emerson's merger offer and on March 22, 1967, negotiations terminated. Shortly there-
after Emerson attempted to effect the merger by a tender offer to the Dodge shareholders.
As a result of this tender, Emerson acquired 13.2% of Dodge Stock. Emerson Elec. Co.
v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 1970).
One reason that this was not an enviable prospect was the possibility that an
exchange of stock might be considered a "sale" of the Dodge common. Emerson might
then be liable under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78p(b)
1970, for any profits realized from such a transaction, if the exchange took place within
six months of Emerson's June 16 purchase. (See text following notes 25 and 69 infra).
Although Emerson could not be sure that courts would construe this exchange as a
"sale," and hence find liability under § 16(b), such a construction was a possibility
that Emerson wanted to avoid. It appears that divestment was wise: a later case held
that in certain situations, exchange of shares in one corporation for those of another
pursuant to a merger agreement constitutes a sale within the meaning of 16(b). Newmark
v. RICO General, Inc., 305 F. Supp., 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.
1970).
4 This two-step sale procedure has been recommended as a seemingly obvious way
to avoid 16(b) liability. See 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1060 (2d ed. 1961) [herein-
after cited as Loss].
ri Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 306 F. Supp. 588 (ED. Mo. 1969).
0 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1 16(b), provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than
an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously con-
tracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit
may be instituted . . . by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the
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a beneficial owner' of more than ten percent of the Dodge common
when it purchased the stock and thus fell within the scope of section
16(b).8
 The court then ruled that Emerson was accountable for the
profits realized from both the first and the second sale, even though at
the time of the second sale Emerson was technically no longer a benefi-
cial owner since it owned less than ten percent of the stock. Reasoning
that Emerson had disposed of all of its Dodge stock in a single plan
of two steps in order to avoid beneficial owner status and hence 16(b)
liability on the second sale, the court construed the phrase "at the
time ... of sale" to extend to the second transaction, since it was part
of a single plan to dispose of stock.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the finding that Emerson was a beneficial owner at the time of pur-
chase,u but reversed the finding that the second sale was covered by
16(b).'°
 The court agreed that the two-step selldown process was con-
issuer in the name of and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or
refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no suit shall be brought more than two
years after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be con-
strued to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both
at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase of the security
involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and
regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this sub-
section.
15 U.S.C.	 78p(b) (1970).
7 Section 16(a) defines a "beneficial owner" as one who owns more than ten percent
of any class of any equity security which is required to be registered under the Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970),
Section 16(b) imposes liability only on one who was a beneficial owner at the
time of purchase and the time of sale. See note 6 supra. Emerson had argued that it
was not a beneficial owner "at the time" of the purchase of the Dodge stock, contend-
ing that "at the time" means prior to, not simultaneous with, the purchase. The gist
of the argument was that if being a beneficial owner of more than 10% gives rise to
the presumption of access to inside information, then owning less than 10% should not
occasion the presumption of access to inside information. Therefore, Emerson maintained,
the presumption should be that Emerson had no inside information prior to the purchase
and hence this purchase should not come under the purview of 16(b), which was designed
to prevent the use of inside information in making both purchases and sales.
However, the district court followed what seems to be the accepted view that "at
the time of purchase" means "simultaneous with purchase," and found Emerson to be a
beneficial owner "at time of purchase." 306 F. Supp. at 589-90, citing Stella v. Graham-
Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 232 F.2d
299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). Cf. Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 305
F. Supp. 310 (S.DN.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 348, 356 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Investment Co., 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark.
1956); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp. 232 F.2d 299, 302-05 (Hincks, J., dis-
senting). See generally W. Painter, Federal Regulations of Insider Trading 40-42 (1968);
Note, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate Consolidation: A Section 16(b) "Purchase
or Sale"?, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1035, 1041-42 n.39 (1969); Munter, Section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn in
Order to Kill the Rats," 52 Cornell L. Rev. 287 (1957); Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1312
(1957).
g 434 F.2d 918, 922-24 (8th Cir. 1970).
10 Id. at 926.
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ceived to avoid liability under the Act, but found this plan to be tech-
nically legal, comparing it to permissible tax avoidance. 11 The court,
relying on the explicit language of section 16(b), which appears to
establish objective tests of ownership and sale activity, rather than
looking to the subjective purpose or plan underlying the sale, found
that after the first sale Emerson no longer owned more than ten per-
cent of the stock and accordingly was not liable under 16(b) for profits
from the second sale.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' to consider for the first
time the liability of parties who resort to such two-step sales. The
Court, applying a literal interpretation of the statute in a 4-3 decision,"
HELD: when a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of the out-
standing stock of a corporation sells its entire holdings in two sepb.rate
transactions, both within six months of purchase, and when the first
sale reduces the holding to less than a ten percent interest, the profits
from the second sale are not recoverable under section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Emerson is significant more for the language and reasoning used
in reaching the result than for the result itself. For some time, the
lower federal courts had been waiting for Supreme Court approval of
either the "objective" or "subjective" approach to 16(b) problems."
At first glance, Emerson seems to be an endorsement of the former and
a rejection of the dominant pre-Emerson trend in which courts had
preferred the latter approach." However, the scope of the Emerson
holding, and particularly its applicability to dissimilar factual situa-
tions, is uncertain.
Before analyzing the Emerson decision and its consequences, this
note will briefly describe section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. The historical development of the judicial approaches to cer-
tain problems of section 16(b) interpretation will then be traced, cul-
minating with an analysis of Emerson in light of the statute and prior
case law,, in order to determine whether the case should be read as a
complete rejection of the trend of judicial interpretation dominant at
the time Emerson was decided. It will be submitted that it is possible
11 Id. at 925.
12 401 U.S. 1008 (1971).
12 404 U.S. 418 (1972). The majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun. Dissenting were Justices Douglas, Brennan and White.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of the case.
14 An
 illustration that the lower courts were waiting for some direction from the
Supreme Court as to the proper interpretation of 16(b) is found in the statement of
Blackmun, 3. [now Justice], dissenting in Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967): "The Supreme Court ultimately may say that
[the subjective] view is to be preferred. At least, Mr. Justice Stewart's attitude is apparent
from his authorship of the opinion in FerraioIo v. Newman. Until the Supreme Court
does so state, however, I must, in good conscience, adhere to my literal and objective
construction preferences." (Citation omitted.)
18 See text following note 58 infra.
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to read the decision as being far more limited than its language sug-
gests.
Section 16(b) was enacted to deter corporate directors, officers
or beneficial owners of the corporation's equity securities—that is, in-
siders"—from making profits on information available to them as a
consequence of their position, but not available to the general public."
One objection to insider trading was that it was basically unfair for
insiders to be able to rely on information not available to other inves-
tors." Secondly, it was felt that insider trading led to abusive practices
whereby the interests of the corporation and the shareholders could be
subordinated to the personal interests of the insiders."
Section 16(b) thus provides in general that a corporation or an
individual shareholder suing on behalf of the corporation may recover
profits realized by an insider from any purchase and sale, or sale and
purchase of the corporation's equity securities made within a six-month
period." Because Congress felt that it would be extremely difficult to
prove actual use or intent to use inside information for personal profit,
there is no provision requiring such proof 2 1 Subsequent case law has
held that proof of use of inside information is not required for re-
covery.' Generally, all that has to be shown is that there was a pur-
chase and sale by an insider and a resultant profit within a six-month
period. An important provision, however, is that a beneficial owner must
18 Directors, officers and beneficial owners of a corporation's securities are commonly
described collectively as "insiders."
11 See note 6 supra for text of * 16(b).
18 The unfairness is said to stem from the fact that the insider derives benefit from
advance information on changing corporate financial policy. Insiders could thus reap
large profits at the expense of the unknowing stockholders from whom they bought
or to whom they sold. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 386 (1953).
19 One example of abusive conduct involved the chairman of a corporation's execu-
tive committee and a director who organized a pool to trade in the stock of their com-
pany. When the pool was organized, the corporation was not paying dividends. Shortly
thereafter, when, the officers caused dividends to be declared, the timing of the declara-
tion was such that more than twenty-five percent of the dividends were received by the
pool. They were paid in spite of the fact that earnings were not sufficient to cover them
and part of the corporation's surplus had to be diverted for that purpose. Id. at 386 n.8,
citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
20 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (1970), quoted in note 6 supra.
21 [I] ou bold the director [liable] irrespective of any intention of expectation
to sell the•security within six months after, because it will be absolutely impos-
sible to prove the existence of such intention of expectation, and you have to
have this crude rule of thumb because you cannot undertake the burden of hav-
ing to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a
short swing.
Testimony of Mr. Thomas Corcoran, chief spokesman for the drafters of 16(b), in Hear-
ings on S. 84, S. 56 and S. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934).
22 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F. id 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
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have held more than ten percent of the corporation's securities at both
the time of purchase and the time of sale." This requirement does not
apply to officers or directors. It was felt that this "crude rule of
thumb"' would be a clear-cut, albeit arbitrary approach to the prob-
lem of defining conduct within the ambit of section 16(b). Problems
soon arose, however, as to whether certain transactions could be de-
fined as purchases or sales.
Generally, the transactions which have given the courts trouble
in applying 16(b) are not the ordinary cash purchases and sales but
the unorthodox transactions which do not fit the standard concept of
purchase and sale." For example, in Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte 28
the issue was whether the exercise of an option converting preferred
stock into common is a "purchase" of the underlying common, to be
linked with the. subsequent sale of the common." Other cases ques-
tioned whether a conversion of one class of common into another class
is a ."purchase" of the latter class;" whether the exchange of shares of
one corporation for shares of a newly formed corporation pursuant to
a statutory merger is a "sale" of the shares of the first corporation;"
and whether the exercise of an option.to
 acquire stock is a "purchase"
of the stock when the options were issued to directors as an incentive."
It soon became obvious that the language of 16(b) did not resolve
these definitional issues and that judicial interpretation was necessary
either to expand or to restrict the definitions of "purchase" and "sale."
In seeking to resolve the underlying problem of definition, the
courts developed two rationales, known as the objective or "crude rule
of thumb" approach and the subjective approach." The objective ap-
proach looked only to the arbitrary and automatic language of 16(b),
without regard to whether or not the insider actually used or intended
to use inside information for personal profit. It was reasoned that Con-
gress had felt that the only way to prevent insider abuses was to estab-
lish a test "which applied without question to any transaction which
28 15 U.S.C. 1 78p(b) ,(1970).
24 Phrase coined by Mr. Thomas C. Corcoran, principal witness at the legislative
hearings on section 16(b). Hearings, supra note 21, at 6557.
25 2 Loss, supra note 4, at 1069.
26 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
27 Ferrai010 v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 927
(1959), was another case involving the issue of whether the conversion of preferred
shares to common was a "purchase" of the common.
28 Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892
(1965).
20 Newmark v. RICO General, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aa'd, 425
F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970).
80 Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950). See generally Meeker & Cooney,
The Problem of DefinitioU in Determining Insider Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45
Va. L. Rev. 949 (1959).
31 For a more detailed analysis of these approaches see Note, Stock Exchanges Pur-




came within its terms; thereby eliminating any possibility of error or
laxity inherent in discretionary administration by the courts."' Ac-
cording to this view, the factual circumstances surrounding the transac-
tions in question are irrelevant.
It should be noted that this refusal to inquire into factual circum-
stances extended not only to the question of the insider's intent but also
to the larger question as to whether there existed any possibility of us-
ing inside information in connection with the transaction. This conclu-
sion may be drawn from the absence of any such inquiry in the "ob-
jective" decisions, while in "subjective" decisions precisely this inquiry
was stressed.83 One commentator has said that the courts using the ob-
jective approach interpreted the statutory language "irrespective of
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner" as meaning "irre-
spective of any possibility of unfair use of inside information."" The
criticism has been made that this approach punished the innocuous as
well as the undesirable transaction, in that even the transaction in
which insider abuse was impossible fell within 16(b), and that such
refusal to look to the possibility of abuse was not required by the lan-
guage of the statute." Rather, the argument went, courts may look to
the existence of a possibility for abuse and still remain as "objective"
as the statute requires. That is, for a court to inquire whether or not
the possibility of a 16(b) abuse existed, and to apply the statutory
sanction only if such possibility were in fact present, did not require
the court to look to the insider's intent or to his use or non-use of the
inside information. This argument was to become the cornerstone of the
"subjective" approach, which would test a transaction by a "possibility
of abuse" standard."
Although the objective test was initially used by the courts, only
a few cases actually employed it fully." The case most often cited as
initiating this approach is Park & Tigard, Inc. v, Schulte," decided in
1947. The defendants, beneficial owners of more than ten percent of the
plaintiff corporation, which constituted control of the company, con-
verted their non-marketable preferred stock into common stock just as
the common was undergoing a spectacular price rise. Within six months
they sold the common. The court held that the conversion of the pre-
ferred was a "purchase" of the common to be matched with the sub-
sequent sale, stating:
32 Id. at 1039.
88 See text at notes 49-52 infra.
•	 34 Lowenfels, Section 16(h): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 Cornell
L. Rev. 45, 58 (1968).
35 See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F. 2d 528, 533 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1006 (1967).
30 See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 34, at 50.
37 Generally, only three cases are cited as following the objective approach: Park
& Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947);
Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); and Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster,
222 F. Supp. 831 (13.N.J. 1963), aff'd in part, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
38 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Whatever doubt might otherwise exist as to whether a con-
version is a "purchase" is dispelled by definition of "pur-
chase" to include 'any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire'. Defendants did not own the common stock in ques-
tion before they exercised their option to convert; they did
afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock, within the
meaning of the Act."
It should be noted that although the language of this decision is
criticized as being overly broad because it seems to make any conver-
sion of preferred into common a "purchase" of common," the result
of the decision arguably would be considered correct even under the
subjective approach, because the facts revealed a real possibility of
abuse of inside information.41
 The defendants, owning a controlling in-
terest in the issuing corporation, could have determined when the pre-
ferred would be called for redemption, and thus the conversion would
not necessarily have been involuntary. Also, because the preferred
shares were non-marketable and not protected against dilution, the in-
siders were exchanging less valuable shares for the more valuable mar-
getable common stock.
Blau v. Hodgkinson,42
 a 1951 decision, also employed the rhetoric
of the objective approach. Each of the several defendants was a direc-
tor of the parent corporation and also an owner of stock in certain sub-
sidiaries. Pursuant to a reorganization, the defendants surrendered
their subsidiary stock iq exchange for stock in the parent company,
which they subsequently sold at a profit within six months of the ex-
change. The court held that the receipt of the parent stock was a "pur-
chase" under 16 (b) and should be matched with the subsequent sale.
Again, the actual result may have been correct even under the subjec-
tive test for possibility of abuse, in that the defendants could have
purchased subsidiary stock with knowledge that it would soon be ex-
changed for stock with greater value. However, instead of limiting its
decision to the particular facts, the Hodgkinson court relied on Judge
Clarke's language in Park & Tilford to the effect that the defendants
had not owned the parent stock before the exchange but had owned it
afterwards and thus had acquired it within the meaning of 16(b)."
This language suggests that all such transactions are subject to 16(b)
sanctions.
The latest endorsement of Park & Tilford is found in Ele/i-Con Corp.
v. Webster," decided in 1965. The defendant, a director of Heli-Coil,
purchased convertible debentures in the corporation on November 20,
1958. On March 18, 1959, he converted the debentures into the under :
89 Id. at 987 (citation omitted).
4o W. Painter, Federal Regulation of Insider Trading 43-44 (1968).
41 2 Loss, supra note 4, at 1067, takes this position.
42 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
48 Id. at 373, citing 160 F2d at 987.
44 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
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lying common and within six months sold the common. The plaintiff
claimed that the conversion of the debentures was a "sale" of the de-
bentures and a "purchase" of the common. The defendant, it was ar-
gued, should therefore be liable for the increase in value of the deben-
tures from the time of their purchase to the time of conversion and also
for the profit from the "purchase" of the common and their subsequent
sale. The district court approved of this argument,'" but the Third Cir-
cuit reversed in part, holding the defendant liable only for the profits
from the "purchase" and sale of the common." The court agreed that
the exchange of the debentures was a "sale" to be matched with the
original purchase, but reasoned that the defendant did not actually
realize any profit until the underlying common was sold. Although one
commentator felt that Heli-Coil was a departure from the objective ap-
proach in that the Third Circuit found that no actual profit had been
realized from the "sale" of the debentures,' the appellate court did
use the objective rhetoric in defining the conversion of debentures as a
"sale" and in holding the defendant liable for the profits accruing from
the second transaction."
Even if it is assumed that the possibility of abuse existed in Park
& Tilford, Hodgkinson and Heli-Coil, the rationale supporting the de-
cisions represented a very real danger that 16(b) would come to be
used to trap the unwary corporate insider as much as to control abusive
practices. If the strict "objective" reading of the statute were to con-
tinue, the insider who had acquired his stock via complex transfers
which in no way permitted reliance on inside information would find
himself forced to give up his profits. Perhaps in recognition of this
potential hardship, appellate courts began, in 1958, to follow the sub-
jective approach.
The subjective approach stresses that the purpose of 16(b) as in-
dicated in its preamble" is the prevention of unfair use of information.
This approach provides for a factual analysis of the transaction in
question to determine whether the transaction in any way allows the
unfair insider trading that 16(b) was designed to prevent. 5° The ap-
proach is not totally subjective, however, because once the court finds
that there exists any possibility of use of inside information, neither
46 222 F. Supp. 831, 834 (D.N.J. 1963).
46 352 F.2d at 167-69.
Lowenfels, supra note 34, at 52.
48 In defining the conversion of the debentures into the common as a "sale" of the
debentures, the court concluded that "Congress intended the test to be an entirely objec-
tive one and that 16(b) does set up a 'rule of thumb' ..." and the "conversion of the
debentures by Webster was a sale of the debentures and a purchase of the common
stock." 352 F.2d at 165-67. However, the court went on to exclude the profits of the pur-
chase and "sale" of the debentures from 16(b) liability because no profits were realized
at the time of the conversion. Id, at 167-68.
48 The preamble refers to "the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director or officer . . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
60 Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 518 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967).
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the insider's intent nor his actual use of the inside information is con-
sidered relevant." Hence the subjective test is consistent with the stat-
ute insofar as intent and use are deemed irrelevant, as the legislature
intended." It is also arguable that the standard of "possibility of
abuse" is consistent with the legislative intention to provide an auto-
matic, mechanical test. It must be admitted, however, that the "possi-
bility of abuse" test is not the same as the "transaction" test that the
statutory language seems to provide.58 The problem is that the statute
does not say whether the possibility of abuse is a permissible standard
or not. Arguably the language of the statute punishes transactions ef-
fected within a certain time frame with no further questions asked.
For that reason the subjective approach has been criticized as being
contrary to the automatic approach Congress intended," as well as be-
ing indefinite and unpredictable."
The criticism that the subjective approach is not automatic is sub-
ject to the counter-argument that the possibility of abuse test may
properly be used at least in those situations when it is impossible to ap-
ply the purely automatic objective test in a purely automatic way: when,
for example, courts must debate whether the transaction in question is
one that Congress intended to prohibit under 16(b). It is precisely this
kind of transaction that is involved in the cases where either the sub-
jective or the objective rationale must be applied; hence the former ap-
proach may be a valid means of resolving a problem not susceptible to
a purely mechanical application of the literal words of the statute. It
may be argued further that even where the transactions clearly come
under the literal wording of the statute, the statutory purpose to cur-
tail abuse of insider information should still be considered. Where
there is no possibility of such abuse, there should be no punishment,
no matter what the nature of the transaction. In any event, the sub-
jective approach has seemed, to many, more rational and fair than the
objective approach, and certainly has gained favor with courts 3° and
commentators" alike.
51
 Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 362 (2d Cir. 1970), affirming 305
F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
52
 Section 16(b) does not require proof of use of inside information as a prerequisite
to recovery. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), quoted in note 6 supra. See also text at note 21
supra.
83 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), quoted in note 6 supra.
84 Hamilton, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The End of an Era, 44
Texas L. Rev. 1447, 1454 (1966).
55 Note, supra note 31, at 1040.
56 Cases that have followed this approach are: Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971); Newmark
v. RKO General, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.
1970); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.DN.Y. 1965), rev'd, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
57 2 Loss, supra note 4, at 1069-70; Lowenfels, supra note 34, at 57-64; Note, supra
note 31, at 1039-45.
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Starting with Ferraiolo v. Newman" in 1958, the subjective ap-
proach has been the prevailing view in appellate decisions." The facts
in Ferraiolo are similar to those in Park & Tilford: the defendant ac-
quired shares of convertible preferred stack in Ashland Oil & Refining
Co. and at the same time became a director of the company. Three
years later he converted these shares into Ashland common and within
six months he sold some of the common at a profit. Also significant
were the facts that the convertibility of the shares was protected
against dilution; that at the time the preferred shares were called for
redemption the preferred and common were both selling at the same
price; and that the defendant had no control over Ashland and could
not pick the time for redemption.
After discussing the legislative history of 16(b), Judge (now Jus-
tice) Stewart enunciated the standard: "Every transaction which can
reasonably be defined as a purchase will be so defined, if the transac-
tion is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the speculation en-
compassed by Section 16(b)."" The court, after reviewing the facts,
held that the transaction did not lend itself to the possibility of insider
abuse and therefore the conversion of the preferred shares was not a
"purchase." The case was distinguished from Park & Tilford in that
this transaction was an involuntary one because the defendant could
not control the time of redemption and because he would have lost nine
dollars a share if he did not convert. Also, the preferred and common
were economic equivalents in Ferraiolo, whereas in Park & Tilford the
common was worth more than the non-marketable preferred.
The vast majority of cases since Ferraiolo have adopted the sub-
jective rationale. In Blau v. Lamb," the defendant was an officer and
director of Air-Way Industries and Edward Lamb Enterprises. Lamb
received convertible preferred stock of Air-Way pursuant to a merger
between Air-Way and Lamb Industries, a corporation almost totally
owned by the Lamb family. Within six months after receiving the Air-
Way preferred, Lamb converted the stock into Air-Way common as
part of a preconceived plan to increase his voting control of Air-Way.
The plaintiff contended that the conversion was a "sale" of the pre-
ferred to be matched with the earlier "purchase." The district court
held for the plaintiff, 62 but the Second Circuit reversed,' adopting the
subjective approach and stating that "the application of Section 16(b)
depends upon whether the transaction in question could tend to ac-
complish what the section was designed to prevent.' The court re-
jected the argument that Congress had removed from the courts the
power to decide that 16(b) should not apply to a transaction that could
58 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
59 See note 56 supra.
60 259 F.2d at 345.
61 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), rev'd, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966).
62 242 F. Supp. at 157.
53 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966).
04 Id. at 519.
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not possibly do the evil the legislature wished to remedy. The court
stated:
[T]he theory of regulation underlying Section 16(b)'s reg-
ulatory mechanism provides a sufficient reason for refusing
to examine the details of transactions once it has been deter-
mined that they might possibly have served as vehicles for
unfair insider trading. But it does not supply an equally suffi-
cient reason for applying Section 16(b) in this same auto-
matic fashion when a substantial question is raised whether a
certain conversion transaction permits a possibility of insider
abuse."
The court then went on to decide that the transaction in question did
not lend itself to insider speculation.
Petteys v. Butler," decided in 1966, is an important decision be-
cause it was decided by the same circuit court that later decided Emer-
son. In Petteys, two directors who were noncontrolling stock holders
of Northwest Airlines converted their preferred stock pursuant to a
call for redemption of the preferred, and within six months sold the
common at a profit. The Eighth Circuit held that the conversion was
not a "purchase" of the common." The court found the case to be
factually similar to Ferraiolo and relied on the rationale of that case.
The Petteys court stated: ,
[T]he rule has been clearly established ... that each case must
be examined on its own particular facts. If, from an exami-
nation of the particular facts, a transaction is of a kind that
can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by §
16(b) and falls within the broad definitions of "purchase"
and "sale," it will be so defined. However, if an examination
of the facts indicates that there is no possibility of abuse,
there is no need to apply a § 16(b) label to the transaction."
The court found no possibility of abuse for basically the same reasons
as in Ferraiolo: involuntariness of the transaction and the economic
equivalence of the stocks.
In Newmark v. RKO General, Inc.," the court used the subjective
approach to hold certain transactions subject to 16(b) liability. The
defendant owned a fifty-six percent controlling interest in Frontier
Airlines, Inc. In April 1967, Frontier and Central Airlines agreed to
merge pursuant to a stock exchange plan. On May 4, RKO contracted
with Central shareholders to buy forty-nine percent of Central shares
at $8.50 per share, the terms of the contract obligating Central share-
65 Id.
66 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
67 Id. at 537.
69 Id. at 535.
69 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970).
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holders to vote in favor of the merger. On September 18 the purchases
were executed and on October 1, 1967, RKO exchanged its Central
stock for Frontier stock pursuant to the merger plan. Plaintiff con-
tended that the exchange of Central shares was a "sale" to be matched
with their prior purchase. The court, applying the subjective test,
stated that the "threshold issue . . . is whether the purchase and sub-
sequent exchange of Central shares lent itself to the type of speculative
abuse which section 16(b) was designed to prevent." 7° The court an-
swered this question in the affirmative basing its response on RKO's
knowledge of the impending merger, the subsequent predictable price
rise of both stocks, and the purchase of the Central stock at a fixed
price, which was bound to be lower than the value of the stocks at the
time of merger. 7 ' Without further inquiry as to actual speculative
abuse, the court held the transaction subject to 16(b) liability.
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp." represents the last fed-
eral appellate application of the subjective test that occurred before the
Emerson decision. By May 10, 1967, Occidental had acquired more
than ten percent of Kern County Land Company in an attempt to take
over Kern. In a defensive maneuver, Kern announced a agreement to
merge with Tenneco, Inc., by means of a stock exchange plan. When
this merger was dosed on August 30, Occidental became entitled to
Tenneco stock in return for its Kern, although the actual transfer did
not take place until December 11. In the meantime, on June 2, Occi-
dental had agreed with Tenneco to issue options to the latter for the
cash purchase of Tenneco's stock that Occidental would receive pur-
suant to the Kern-Tenneco merger. On December 11, 1967, after Occi-
dental received the Tenneco shares, this option was exercised. Shortly
thereafter, plaintiff asserted that Occidental was subject to 16(b) lia-
bility on the grounds that Occidental had "sold" its Kern Shares on
August 30, when it became irrevocably entitled to the Tenneco stock.
Judge Friendly, speaking for the court, rejected the Park & Til-
ford mechanistic approach and instead stated that the court would look
to the question of whether the receipt of securities of another company
in a transaction which the insider did not arrange could have lent itself
to speculative abuse." The court then decided that Occidental could
have had no knowledge that Kern would defensively merge and that
there was no possibility of speculative abuse merely because Occidental
failed either to make a higher offer or to attempt to block the merger.
A major factor influencing this decision was the court's reluctance to
let Kern use Occidental's possible 16(b) liability to induce Tenneco
to merge." This inducement would exist since the potential liability
would be viewed as a potential asset of the merged corporation.
7° Id. at 353.
71 Id. at 353-54.
72 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
7° Id. at 162.
74 Id. at 163-64.
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Then, a year or so after Occidental Petroleum, the Emerson case
brought a new dimension to the subjective/objective controversy by
requiring a decision as to 16(b)'s applicability to two-step selldown
transactions. Because both the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court
looked to the objective language of 16(b) and refused to apply the
possibility of abuse test, it might well be concluded that the objective
rationale had not only been revived but had emerged victorious over
the subjective rationale. However, in light of (1) the strong trend to
apply the subjective approach, (2) the fact that Justice Stewart, the
author of the Emerson opinion, had first articulated the subjective ra-
tionale in Ferraiolo, and (3) the Eighth Circuit's strong endorsement
of this approach in Petteys, it is submitted that in Emerson neither the
Eighth Circuit nor the Supreme Court meant to reject the subjective
approach for all 16 (b) transactions."
A brief review of the facts of Emerson reveals that they are ap-
parently very similar to those of the Occidental Petroleum case. Emer-
son attempted to merge with Dodge but was outflanked by Dodge's
defensive merger with Reliance. Instead of accepting Reliance stock
at merger time and then selling it, Emerson chose to divest itself of its
Dodge holdings immediately. Both Occidental and Emerson were out-
flanked tender offerors who were trying to make the best out of a bad
situation. On these facts it is difficult to ascertain why the Supreme
Court chose not to apply the subjective test in Emerson when the Sec-
ond Circuit had applied it in Occidental.
A clue to what the Supreme Court had in mind may be found in
the language of the Emerson opinion. The Court said that "where al-
ternative constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are possible, those terms
are to be given the construction that best serves the congressional pur-
pose of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate insiders."'" This
language is similar to the statement in Ferraiolo by Justice Stewart
(then a judge with the Sixth Circuit) that "[e]very transaction which
can be reasonably defined as a purchase will be so defined, if the trans-
action is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the speculation en-
compassed by Section 16(b)." 77
Then in a footnote the Emerson opinion stated: "In interpreting
the terms of 'purchase' and 'sale,' courts have properly asked whether
the particular type of transaction involved is one that gives rise to
speculative abuse."" Paradoxically, the Court then moved away from
this initial endorsement of the subjective approach and said in effect
that to treat the two sales as one, on the ground that Emerson intended
75 Note, 60 Geo. L.J. 815, 821 (1972), suggests that the Eighth Circuit's discussion
of Emerson is an across-the-board endorsement of the objective approach to 16(b) prob-
lems.
78 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972) (emphasis added).
77 Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958) (emphasis added).
78 404 U.S. at 424 n.4.
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to avoid liability, would be contrary to the congressional desire that
the statute be applied mechanically."
It is submitted that a major concern of the Supreme Court was
the fact that the cash sale of stock did not present a case which re-
quired a construction of the term "purchase" or "sale." If the Court
were to apply the subjective approach to the second transaction, logi-
cally it would have to apply it to the first sale, probably exempting the
first sale from liability, if the Court should find no possibility of use of
inside information." To exempt either sale on the basis that it was not
a sale within the meaning of 16(b) would require a clear departure
from statutory language—a departure that the Court was not prepared
to take. The statute is concerned with sales; unlike mergers, options or
exchanges of stock, the transactions involved in Emerson were clearly
sales. Were the Court to have utilized a subjective rationale, it would
have been forced, in effect, to construe a term that did not call for con-
struction. Thus, to avoid having to construe the term "sale" in this
situation, the Court simply applied a literal interpretation of the stat-
ute. Since Emerson was not a ten percent holder at the time of the sec-
ond sale, the Court reasoned, the second sale should not precipitate lia-
bility. The Court suggested that this freedom from liability constitutes
a loophole but maintains that 16(b) was not meant to reach every in-
sider transaction; 81 if Congress views this two-step selldown process
as an evil, it can close the loophole by amending the statute."
It can be argued, however, that the Court should have looked to
the possibility of use of inside information." Merely because Emer-
son's transactions were cash sales does not mean that they could not be
defined in accordance with the purpose of 16(b), which is to prevent
unfair use of inside information for speculative profit by insiders: that
is, the Court could have insisted on a limiting definition of the term
"sales" that would exclude those sales clearly outside the ambit of the
congressional concern. Had the Court adopted this approach, it might
have been required to deny recovery in the first as well as the second
sale, but apparently this would have been an equitable result in this
79 Id. at 424-25.
80 In advocating the application of the subjective approach to the Emerson situation,
one author suggests that since there was no possibility of use of inside information in
either the first or second sale, neither should be subject to liability. Not; supra note 75,
at 822.
81 404 U.S. at 422-23.
82 "If a 'two-step' sale of a 10% owner's holdings within six months of purchase is
thought to give rise to the kind of evil that Congress sought to correct through 16(b),
those transactions can be more effectively deterred by an amendment to the statute .. .."
Id. at 425.
8 3 In an unusual application of the subjective approach, the dissent in Emerson
advocates that the court look to the possibility of abuse and then concludes, without
explaining, that there existed a possibility of abuse. In effect, the dissent would use the
subjective approach to restore the arbitrary aspect of 16(b), while most recent courts
have used it to soften the harshness of 16(b). Id. at 427-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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case." At the same time the Court could have laid the foundation for
denying recovery in future cases where a two-step selldown might be
based on inside information. Thus the Court could itself have closed
the loophole, instead of calling on Congress to make an amendment
whenever a new type of transaction does not seem to fall within the
exact wording of the statute. 85
The Emerson decision, while adopting a literal interpretation of
16(b), probably has a more limited scope than at first appears. As far
as precedential value is concerned, it should not be read as a complete
rejection of the subjective test. Rather, Emerson seems to stand for
the proposition that the subjective test is not to be used in cases where
the transaction in question is clearly a cash purchase or sale. However,
because this limitation is not expressly stated, the opinion is confusing,
especially to those who are looking for an endorsement of either the
subjective or objective test from the Court. Furthermore, even the
limited proposition the case does seem to stand for is subject to ques-
tion. It would seem proper for the Court to define even cash purchases
and sales in terms of the congressional purpose and so put transactions
such as those in Emerson to the same test as transactions that ob-
viously require definition of the term sale, such as mergers. If there is
no possibility that the cash purchase or sale could arise from or lead to
use of insider information, there should be no liability.
Emerson must also be criticized for being overly broad in allow-
ing two-step selldown procedures even though future two-step cases,
unlike Emerson, may clearly involve speculative abuse. A resort to the
language and spirit of the subjective approach would have precluded
this result.
WALTER C. SPIEGEL
84 On May 27, 1967, after Emerson had embarked on a tender offer plan, Dodge
filed suit to enjoin Emerson from accepting tenders of Dodge stock. The federal district
court, in an unreported opinion, denied the injunction, finding that Emerson possessed
no inside information about Dodge. 434 F.2d at 920 n.5. After acquiring the 13.2 percent
interest in Dodge, Emerson once again proposed a merger. The Dodge board of directors
rejected the proposal and refused to allow Emerson to examine the stockholder list. Id. at
920 n.6. These two factors, highlighting the strained relation between Dodge and Emer-
son, make it highly unlikely that Emerson had any inside information either at the time
of the purchase or the time of the sale of the Dodge common.
86 As suggested in Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider
Trading, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 45, 64 (1968), it may be impractical to ask a busy Congress
to make these amendments:
Congress has many more pressing and important problems than the fate of one
comparatively obscure provision of the federal securities laws. Rather, the solu-
tion would seem to lie with the federal courts .... The development and exten-
sion of the subjective interpretation of section 16(b) • . [is] the most practical
solution to what has in reality become a statutory anachronism.
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